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The Rise and Fall of Safeguard: Anti-Ballistic Missile Technology and the 
Nixon Administration 
 
Abstract 
 
The Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile system was the first (and up until 2002 
the only) system deployed to defend the US from nuclear-armed ballistic 
missile attack. It was finally declared operational in September 1975 after 
many years of development and fierce controversy over both its feasibility 
and its desirability. However, almost immediately Congress voted to close the 
system down and it was dismantled within a few months. This paper draws 
on documents available in the Nixon archives to describe the complex 
intertwining of ‘politics’ and ‘technology’ that meant that a system that 
involved huge investment, and that had been portrayed as central to US 
defense policy, became apparently dispensable almost overnight. 
Introduction 
 
On September 28, 1975 the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was 
declared fully operational.i Located close to Grand Forks, North Dakota, and 
designed to protect the nearby Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) field, this site had originally been intended to be the first of several. 
As announced in March 1969, the full twelve-site system was to provide 
protection not just of US ICBM fields against Soviet ballistic missile attack, but 
also ‘area defense’ of the American population from the incipient Chinese 
missile threat or accidental missiles launches. However, almost immediately 
after being declared operational Congress voted to deactivate Safeguard, and 
it was withdrawn from service in February 1976. 
Although there would be a resurgence in support for missile defense 
development under President Reagan, initiated by his famous ‘Star Wars’ 
speech of March 23, 1983, Safeguard stands alone as the only ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) system deployed to defend the United States until the 
Administration of G. W. Bush gave the go-ahead for the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in 2002. Surprisingly, however, the 
development and demise of the Safeguard system has been neglected by 
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historians even though many documents are now available in the Nixon 
archives.ii Other episodes in the history of US BMD development have 
received considerably more attention - both the ABM deliberations of 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the 1960s and the ambitious 
programme of research set in train by Reagan have attracted extensive 
literatures.iii 
What stands out about Safeguard is that a procurement programme that went 
reasonably smoothly in terms of budget and schedule culminated in a 
decision to deactivate the system almost immediately after it became 
operational.iv The story of Safeguard thus appears to provide a compelling 
refutation of perspectives that see military technology as driven by the vested 
interests of a Military-Industrial Complex.v The huge investments that were 
made in twenty years of ABM development did not result in overwhelming 
‘technological momentum’.vi Nor did large technological accomplishments - 
material, epistemological, organisational, and political – result in ‘lock-in’.vii  
This is significant because it is widely believed - amongst both supporters and 
opponents of weapons systems - that once deployment goes ahead, it 
becomes very difficult to reverse.viii For example, Ralph Lapp argued that: 
‘Once an R&D project emerges from the conceptual stage and enters the 
development phase where big money is involved, then it tends to build up a 
momentum of its own.’ix And in 1969, ABM opponent Adam Yarmolinsky 
expressed concern about the ‘momentum of the ABM production line’, 
arguing that ‘once initiated, it would unleash powerful forces pressing 
towards elaboration and expansion’.x  
However, this fear proved unfounded, as Safeguard turned out to be the end 
of the ABM era, rather than the first step of a ‘technological trajectory’.xi To 
understand why this was so we need to uncover why it was that the 
technological edifice that Safeguard comprised was such a fragile 
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achievement. Why did a system that cost over $30 billionxii (in 2010 dollars) 
not develop ‘momentum’ or become ‘locked-in’?  
The classic economic approach to understanding lock-in has focused on how 
increasing returns from investment result in a chosen technology being 
improved and thus gaining competitive advantage relative to competitors 
that did not receive the initial investment.xiii Increasing adoption of a 
technology can also result in ‘network externalities’ that further entrench a 
technology because of societal investments in associated skills (e.g. expertise 
in using a QWERTY keyboard) or complementary assets (e.g. petrol stations 
for conventional automobile technology).xiv 
Donald MacKenzie’s sociological account of the development of inertial 
guidance technology shows that what appear to be technological trajectories 
are social constructs rather than natural phenomena.xv Continued investment 
means that ‘success breeds success’ while alternative approaches are 
neglected and fail to make such improvements. However, as William Walker 
has noted, most large government projects (such as defense and 
infrastructure) differ from commercial technologies because of their 
dependence on government support, and because in many cases their limited 
production runs mean they benefit less from increasing returns.xvi 
Whereas commercial success is largely down to ‘the market’, success for 
government projects is mainly dependent on political and organisational 
commitment. Based on a case-study of the UK development of nuclear 
reprocessing, Walker argues that it is this commitment, and particularly the 
extent to which it is given ‘contractual’ permanence – either in commercial 
contracts or through other forms of difficult-to-break arrangements, such as 
international agreements – that determines how locked-in a technology 
becomes.xvii  
This paper will draw on archival material to describe how it was that the 
commitment to Safeguard– in the Nixon Administration and its supporters, in 
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the Congress, in industry, and in the military – that was apparently aligned in 
1969, would so completely unravel by 1975. As will become clear, the central 
mystery here is not why Safeguard was cancelled, but how it was ever 
approved when even its supporters disagreed about its primary purpose, and 
so many arguments were being made against it, particularly with regard to its 
technical effectiveness. For this reason, this paper will focus on the key period 
(1969-1971) during which the Nixon Administration pressed for approval of 
Safeguard.  
Background to the Safeguard Deployment 
 
The launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in October 1957 was significant for 
US missile defense efforts in two main ways. First, the Army was given 
responsibility for ABM system development, despite the protestations of the 
Air Force.xviii Second, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was 
set up to investigate state-of-the-art defense applications of science and 
technology, with a large part of its budget devoted to missile defense work in 
Project Defender. The first ABM system developed by the Army was the Nike 
Zeus three-stage missile armed with a nuclear warhead, along with associated 
radar, control, and communications systems to direct the missile towards the 
target reentry vehicle. From 1960 onwards the Army pressed for deployment 
with no success, despite enrolling support in Congress ‘to loose the Zeus’.xix  
However, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara repeatedly rejected the 
Army’s requests for Zeus deployment, and in 1963 instead instigated the 
Nike-X programme. Nike-X involved two major advances over Zeus. First, 
Nike-X utilised a layered defense, with a longer range version of the Zeus 
missile (later to be known as Spartan) as the first line of defense, able to 
intercept warheads up to a 100 mile altitude. A second line of defense was 
provided by the high acceleration Sprint missile that was designed to 
intercept reentry vehicles within the atmosphere, by which time any decoys 
or other lightweight penetration aids would have been stripped away by 
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drag. The second significant advance of Nike-X was the use of phased array 
radars that had been developed by ARPA in Project Defender. Because they 
scanned electronically rather than mechanically, these radars were less 
vulnerable, and could handle many more targets, more rapidly.xx 
Further efforts by the Army to get ABM deployment approved were rebuffed 
for three reasons. First, McNamara was concerned that this would be 
technologically premature and that early deployment would result in 
wasteful obsolescence. Second, comparisons of the effects of various 
combinations of offense and defense on American casualties in a nuclear 
exchange suggested that investment in ballistic missile defenses would not be 
cost effective.xxi Better value, in terms of American lives saved per dollar, 
could be achieved by enhancing the ability of US offensive weapons to 
penetrate Soviet defenses and by US civil defense efforts.xxii Third, McNamara 
was concerned about the arms race implications of an offense-defense 
competition.xxiii 
McNamara was eventually over-ruled by President Johnson in 1967. 
Disillusioned with the state of the war in Vietnam and fearful of an ‘ABM 
gap’ being used against him in the 1968 presidential campaign, Johnson 
pushed McNamara towards a compromise.xxiv The arguments of ABM 
supporters were also enhanced by the detonation of China’s first H-bomb in 
June 1967, and by McNamara’s failure to convince the Soviet Premier Kosygin 
that defensive systems should be limited to prevent an arms race.xxv The 
result was McNamara’s famous San Francisco speech of September 1967. The 
Chinese developments provided a rationale for McNamara to give some 
ground on ABM deployment – endorsing a limited system aimed at the 
potential Chinese threat – while resisting the major deployment geared 
towards the Soviet threat which he believed to be not only futile but also 
counterproductive.xxvi 
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The resulting Sentinel ABM system was thus designed to handle a threat that 
when it eventually emerged was expected to comprise only a small number of 
technologically unsophisticated ICBMs.xxvii Against this threat even a ‘thin’ 
ABM system might be effective, but such a system would not pose a 
significant threat to the much larger and more capable Soviet nuclear forces. 
Moreover, McNamara noted, in addition to defending against the Chinese, 
this thin ABM could have secondary benefits. First, it could be used to defend 
US Minuteman missile fields, thus adding to the ability of the US to guarantee 
assured destruction retaliation. Second, it could provide protection against 
any accidental launches of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.  
Of the fifteen areas chosen to be the locations of Sentinel installations, ten 
were major urban centres, one was in Alaska, and the other four were air 
force bases that housed US retaliatory forces. However, the location of many 
of these bases exacerbated the opposition to ABM technology. Along with 
those who argued that the technology would not work, or that it was 
strategically unwise, or both, other protesters now complained about the 
proximity of Sentinel to cities. Critics such as the Federation of American 
Scientists argued that Sentinel bases would be targets, thus drawing down 
fire on nearby cities, making them ‘megaton magnets’, and there was also 
concern that the nuclear warheads on ABM interceptors might explode 
accidentally or, in the case of launch, prematurely.xxviii  
Ironically, after years of pushing to deploy an ABM system (typically voting 
for funding that the Administration left unused), Congress now saw the 
emergence of a coordinated coalition against the ABM.xxix Given this upsurge 
of opposition, it was not surprising that the Administration of Richard Nixon 
initiated a review of US strategic programmes on 20 January 1969, shortly 
after taking office. On 6 February 1969, the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin 
Laird, halted the Sentinel programme, pending completion of this review.xxx 
According to Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, this was 
done ‘in order to pull the teeth of public criticism.’xxxi Born in domestic 
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politics – as a political fix intended to counter the prospect of Republicans 
citing an ‘ABM-gap’ in the 1968 Presidential election - Sentinel thus also died 
due to domestic politics. However, both Nixon and Kissinger’s instincts ‘were 
against unilaterally giving up a weapons program’, and the ABM would be 
reborn in a different guise.xxxii 
The Safeguard Compromise 
 
The new ABM approach, called Safeguard, was announced by Nixon on 
March 14, 1969. Safeguard was to encompass up to twelve sites, with initial 
Phase 1 construction of two sites to protect Minuteman fields at Air Force 
bases in Montana and North Dakota. Alongside this primary role of 
protecting US deterrent forces, the full Safeguard system was also intended to 
provide population defense against a light attack from China or against an 
accidental launch. 
Four sites were to be located close to Minuteman fields and would use both 
the long-range Spartan interceptors as well as Sprints for terminal defense. 
Most of the other eight sites would only use Spartan interceptors, thus 
providing complete coverage of the United States, albeit only against a small 
threat. Moving defensive sites away from cities had a political logic, but it 
also chimed with those who believed that Minuteman defense was not only 
desirable, and also more feasible than population defense. For example, 
Harold Agnew, Weapons Division Leader at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory argued that an ABM system ‘could add significantly to the 
survivability of our strategic missile forces, the command centers which 
control their use and the command structure’, pointing out that ‘technically 
hardpoint terminal defense is a much easier problem than that associated 
with area defense’.xxxiii 
However, the technical difference between Sentinel and Safeguard was 
slightxxxiv and the overall rationale for Safeguard was as much an outcome of 
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politics as it was of coherent strategic thinking. As Time magazine noted at 
the time, Safeguard had ‘both the virtues and defects of most compromises: it 
may fall short of either its political or military objective, but it has a fair 
chance of being accepted by Congress and may be politically tenable for a 
while’.xxxv In particular, Safeguard was a compromise between those in the 
Administration who preferred Minuteman defense against the Soviet Union 
and those who favoured population defense against China or an accidental 
missile launch. President Nixon was keen to emphasize the potential for 
protecting the US people from missile attack, but the Department of Defense, 
and Secretary of Defense Laird were much more interested in defense of US 
retaliatory forces such as the Minuteman missiles. 
Thus Kissinger wrote to President Nixon in early March 1969 that:  
It is important to recognize that believers in at least two 
fundamentally different views have united behind the Modified 
Sentinel proposal. ... One view is that the Modified Sentinel 
deployment fills important gaps in the protection of our 
deterrent and provides options for meeting possible new threats 
to our deterrent that have not yet appeared, such as accurate 
Soviet MIRVs. Area protection of our population is a valuable 
by-product of this deployment, but no greater protection of our 
cities should be contemplated because this would stimulate a 
costly arms race, increase the instability in US-Soviet strategic 
relationships, and ultimately leave us no better off.xxxvi 
 
However, the other group supporting what would become Safeguard saw 
‘the deployment primarily as a useful first step toward obtaining a major 
damage limiting capability against the Soviet Union as well as a necessary 
step in maintaining an invulnerable deterrent. Holders of this view fully 
expect to propose additional deployments for the defense of cities later on 
unless arms control agreements make such deployments unnecessary.’xxxvii  
 9 
The Battle for Congressional Support 
 
On 10 March Nixon was informed by one of his advisors, Bryce Harlow, that:  
Careful analysis of the immediate situation in the Senate 
strongly indicates: 1) The ABM system advanced by LBJ has no 
chance whatsoever; 2) Even a modified system can now be 
passed only with maximum effort, including all-out Presidential 
participation. … We estimate right now in the Senate the 
modified plan would lose by 58-42.xxxviii 
 
Given this analysis, there was debate within the Administration about what 
approach to adopt in the Congressional battle. Some were keen to use tough 
tactics, making full use of the resources of the government to attack 
opponents. A particular target of Administration hardliners was Senator 
Edward Kennedy, one of the most outspoken and publicity-friendly of the 
ABM opponents. Patrick Buchanan, one of the President’s key advisors, wrote 
to Nixon suggesting that this approach ‘would give us the ABM and it would 
throw Edward M. Kennedy into the posture of a naive young Senator who 
would leave America naked in a hostile world of powerful enemies.’ 
Buchanan argued that ‘[i]n 1964 Candidate Goldwater had his feet cut out 
from under him by Secretary McNamara’s selective release of confidential 
material relating to the American deterrent.’ He continued: ‘No campaign 
staff can compete with the Department of Defense – with its thousands of 
secrets tucked away. We now have that million-man research staff and files – 
and we ought to use it in this ABM battle with EMK.’ Buchanan thus argued 
for the selective, well-timed release of information about Soviet and Chinese 
military forces:  
 10 
Yes, it would scare the American people some perhaps. But it 
would give them the truth. … What would Kennedy do? Get 
Jerome Wiesner to deny the facts the Department of Defense has 
put out? We’ve got the megaphone now; and we’ve got all the 
data – let’s use it judiciously for our own purposes, just as they 
used it for theirs. … We can not only win this fight; we can visit 
some permanent damage on our opponents for the future – if 
we let them climb out on that limb far enough – and then break 
it off. … Wait until the crucial moment in the Senate debate, 
(even if we are going to win), and then have Laird unload on 
EMK and all his friends, and see how they come out of the 
hailstorm.xxxix 
However, others in the Administration, including Kissinger’s military 
assistant General Al Haig, argued for a more moderate approach to ABM 
opponents. Haig expressed his concern that ‘we are about to indulge in a 
campaign which is every bit as insidious as that of the opponents of the 
system and probably a great deal less sophisticated.’xl He was particularly 
worried that a ‘return to the middle ages approach … will alienate a large 
segment of sophisticated Americans who, while conscious of the realities of 
the east-west problem, will be highly suspicious of the rhetoric of the early 
fifties.’xli 
To some extent the Congress could now be seen as representative of those 
‘sophisticated Americans’. Traditionally, Congressional hearings had relied 
on the DoD or other governmental experts to provide advice on weapons 
programmes. However, this changed on March 6, 1969 when outside 
scientists began a series of appearances before several committees of both the 
House and the Senate.xlii Many of those testifying were critical of the plan to 
deploy Safeguard and the Administration sought to respond to this activity 
by seeking out supportive scientists.xliii The Administration’s perceptions on 
this matter can be seen in the title of a memo that Kissinger sent to Bryce 
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Harlow on 14 April, 1969. Although the memo contained what was described 
as ‘a list of additional scientists who probably favor the ABM,’ it was entitled 
‘‘List of Scientists Who Have Unbiased Views on the ABM’.xliv 
ABM opponents largely shared the views that McNamara had held during his 
term in office, and indeed many of the leading opponents had either served in 
former Administrations or had been closely involved as advisors on ABM 
issues. These included all former Presidential Science Advisers (James Killian, 
George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner and Donald Hornig), some members 
of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (Sidney Drell, Wolfgang 
Panofsky, Marvin Goldberger), former ARPA Chief Scientist and Director of 
Defense Research & Engineering, Herbert York, former ARPA director Jack 
Ruina, and George Rathjens, also of ARPA. 
The 1969 Congressional debates were detailed, confrontational, and at times 
highly personal.xlv The closest the opponents came to stopping Safeguard was 
a key Senate vote on August 6 that resulted in a tied vote, with 50 senators for 
and 50 against, and the pro-ABM lobby only carrying the day due to the 
casting vote of the Vice-President Spiro Agnew.xlvi This, however, was the 
highpoint of Congressional opposition to Safeguard, with other votes being 
carried more easily by its supporters. 
Nixon himself took a very active role in lobbying for Safeguard, he 
‘alternately cajoled and berated both supporters and opponents’, and even 
criticized some members of his own cabinet, among them Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird, for not ‘doing enough’ to promote Safeguard.xlvii When 
he read that former astronaut and Democratic Senator John Glenn had called 
the ABM a ‘false hope’ because ‘no one knows if it works,’ Nixon asked 
sarcastically: ‘did he know the first space shot would absolutely work?’ 
However, Nixon was also very pragmatic about the lobbying process, telling 
his staff to ‘concentrate on those [senators] who are on the fence and only on 
those where we have a chance to win.’xlviii 
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Congressional approval of Safeguard was thus a personal triumph for Nixon, 
and he had no doubt where most of the credit lay. On August 7, 1969 he sent 
a memo to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger, stressing his achievement 
(and referring to himself in the third person): 
The ABM vote is a major victory and I want the three of you to 
discuss it with Harlow in terms of getting out the true story as 
to Presidential influence and the “Nixon Style” in dealing with 
the Congress. First get out the practical information as to what 
the count was (20-46 with the rest undecided) before RN made 
his television speech and what the final result was. Then point 
out that RN made the decision to tackle ABM head on against 
the advice of most of his major advisers, including particularly 
the State Department. His television broadcast turned the thing 
around and started us on the way up. … Never in history has 
probably a President, individually and collectively talked to 
more Senators on an issue than in this case. … Also in this 
connection, point out that the President was in constant charge 
of the PR aspects of the ABM fight and dictated memoranda to 
be used by the PR people about getting out the positive line and 
also watched the press closely to knock down anything in the 
way of intelligence reports or other things that might be 
harmful. … particularly emphasize that the difference with the 
RN style and that of Johnson and Kennedy was that never was 
there any implication whatever of arm-twising [sic], threats, 
etc.xlix 
 
Administration Divisions 
 
The Congressional battle of 1969 resulted in approval of the Administration’s 
Phase 1 plan to construct two sites – Grand Forks in North Dakota and 
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Malmstrom in Montana - both of which were to defend Minuteman fields. In 
late 1969 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) started ‘conducting an 
intensive internal review of the ABM program to determine options as to how 
and when to proceed with additional construction’.l The tone of this review 
worried Laurence Lynn, one of Kissinger’s NSC staffers, because he was felt 
that Director of Defense Research and Engineering John Foster ‘did not seem 
to be particularly sensitive to the importance attached here to the area defense 
portion of the system, a point which I underlined heavily’.li  
Lynn’s views mattered because of Kissinger’s close relationship with Nixon - 
so close that the term ‘Nixingerism’ has been used to describe their approach 
to foreign affairs.lii This meant that the NSC had an unusual level of influence 
within the Administration on a matter such as the ABM. Lynn’s concern 
about area defense was that it would be ‘this part of the system that is likely 
to fall through the cracks, particularly since it is the least popular with 
Congress and the part that draws the fire of the arms controllers.’ His guess 
was ‘that DOD will try to skimp as much as possible in their FY 71 budget 
request for Safeguard and propose to slip the program’. The intention would 
be, Lynn wrote to Kissinger on 23 October, that ‘in a classic manner DOD may 
try to game the President into increasing the DOD budget by leaving “his” 
program [area defense] out of their request’.liii 
A couple of days later, another memo from Lynn to Kissinger stressed that: 
‘The President attaches great importance to the area defense portion of the 
program.’ In particular, Lynn noted that ‘maintenance of area defense against 
third countries and accidents is a Presidentially-approved criterion of 
strategic sufficiency (NSDM 16) and should be given priority.’liv 
The OSD’s review of Safeguard was ready at the end of the year. Its basic 
recommendations were a restatement of the Phase 2 Safeguard deployment 
plan to ‘(a) Extend area defense against the Chinese Threat (b) Broaden the 
base for Minuteman defense (c) Begin to implement the defense against the 
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SLBM threat.’ The review argued that it ‘is clear that the threat against which 
Safeguard was configured last year has continued to grow. … to implement 
Phase 1 only would not be adequate, and we therefore recommend 
proceeding with the first step of Phase 2 deployment.’lv 
This meant beginning deployment of two more sites – Whiteman (in the 
Minuteman fields near St Louis) and the Northwest site - along with 
‘advanced preparation of three more sites – Northeast, Washington, DC, and 
Michigan/Ohio.’ The timetable proposed deployment of the full twelve sites 
by October 1977, providing ‘area defense of the entire United States against a 
Chinese or other Nth country attack and of most of the strategic bomber bases 
against attack by depressed trajectory SLBMs.’ In terms of population 
defense, it was estimated that ‘the system would be able to absorb about 100 
warheads,’ and against ‘SLBM attack, the system could blunt the leading edge 
of the attack on the bomber fields and absorb about 20 to 30 warheads per 
Safeguard site’, thus providing ‘about 10 or more additional minutes for the 
protected alert bombers to escape to safety.’lvi  
In the meantime, Phase 1 deployment at Grand Forks and Malmstrom was 
primarily geared towards Minuteman defense. Along with the third site at 
Whiteman, due to be installed by July 1975, and fourth at Warren by April 
1977, these four sites were to house 120 Spartan and 264 Sprint missiles. 
Against ‘the lower threat level of 1000 to 1400 arriving Soviet RV’s [reentry 
vehicles], 200 to 300 Minuteman would be expected to survive’; against 
‘higher threat levels, say 2000 arriving RV’s, the Safeguard Phase 2 
deployment would be overwhelmed, but would still absorb some 300 to 400 
RV’s which would otherwise be usable against our cities.’ lvii 
This calculation that Safeguard could be thus overwhelmed led OSD to 
recommend the ‘development and evaluation of new defense components 
optimized for “hard-point” defense.’ In particular, they saw a need for ‘an 
improved Sprint and a smaller and cheaper radar and computer system.’ 
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Without such technical improvements, the review concluded, likely 
developments in the threat would undermine the future effectiveness of 
Safeguard: ‘The two serious technical arguments against the system are Soviet 
ICBM force expansion to the point where they simply overwhelm the system 
and the advancement of Chinese technology to the point where area defense 
becomes very difficult.’lviii 
NSC staffer Lynn read much into the OSD’s report and much to concern him. 
He was especially worried about the apparent lack of faith in the capability of 
the current ABM technology, but these doubts had, of course, ramifications 
for planning. If the technology was not expected to work very well, did it 
make sense to build more sites to defend Minuteman in addition to the two 
that were already underway? ‘The main argument for doing so’, Lynn noted, 
‘is that if a full four site Safeguard Minuteman defense is in danger of being 
overwhelmed, two sites could be overwhelmed that much easier. The best 
way to handle the threat we will probably face in the early to mid-1970s is 
simply to proliferate the defense system we can have the quickest.’lix 
On the other hand, Lynn suggested that there were arguments against that 
approach:  
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We do not yet have a good technical solution to land-based 
missile survivability. Let’s not commit ourselves to any more of 
the Safeguard solution than we have to and in the meantime 
pursue alternatives on a priority basis. … The full Safeguard 
deployment calls for about 900 interceptors and 19 radars. If we 
should want to enter into an agreement with the Soviets to limit 
ABM deployments to a thin third country defense oriented 
against China, we would probably prefer Washington, DC and 
Michigan/Ohio to Whiteman, and we might not want 
Whiteman at all. Why not proceed with these and preserve our 
flexibility later to choose more Minuteman defense or a twelve 
site area defense or both?lx 
Lynn was also concerned that ‘DOD has presented only a loosely structured 
rationale for the full deployment’, giving the impression that ‘they clearly 
regard it as an interim solution’.lxi It was obvious to him that the DoD was 
keen on ‘hard-point’ Minuteman defense and ‘clearly wants to move smartly 
in this direction’. Lynn’s view, however, was that ‘the stronger we argue for 
priority development of advanced components, the more we furnish the 
opposition with an argument to stop present deployments until these new 
components are available.’lxii 
The apparent indifference of the DoD to the full Phase 2 deployment 
stemmed not just from concern over the effectiveness of Safeguard as a 
Minuteman defense, but also from doubts about the area defense role. The 
compromise that was Safeguard appeared in danger of unraveling. Lynn 
noted that:  
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This year it will be even more important than it was last that the 
decision be related to a coherent rationale, which is uniformly 
understood and adopted throughout the Government. … It will 
no longer be possible to argue that the deployment definitely 
planned is essentially only “R&D at an operational site,” with 
the ultimate purpose the one most congenial to the speaker and 
his audience. Further deployments – for more Minuteman 
protection and especially for some area defense – mean we are 
building a particular operational system for a particular 
purpose. We must be able to defend the system in those 
terms.lxiii 
Lynn mused as to whether commitment to the original deployment plan 
should come first: ‘Should we announce our intention to proceed with the full 
twelve site, multi-purpose program and develop the rationale for it, or should 
we commit ourselves to a less ambitious area defense program tailored to a 
specific rationale?’lxiv Again, however, there was a problem with the area 
defense role of Safeguard; that it was difficult to defend on the grounds of 
effectiveness: ‘Critics can be expected to emphasize that the system affords 
essentially no protection to the population against a determined attack. The 
arguments why the area component is nonetheless diplomatically and 
strategically useful are subtle and easily misstated in dangerous ways.’lxv 
As it happened the divisions in the Administration could not be readily 
contained and became public in January 1970. Secretary of Defense Laird 
made his views clear when ‘both in his formal press conference and in his 
planeside statement on Sunday’, he ‘focused on the threat to Minuteman and 
tended to downplay the area defense role of Safeguard.’lxvi This was 
problematic because: ‘The President is committed to an area defense 
component for Safeguard and three of the five sites to which we would be 
committed under the DOD-recommended plan are primarily for area 
defense.’lxvii Nor did it help that ‘Mr Laird’s comment about the failure of the 
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Chinese threat to increase will not make it any easier to defend the area 
defense elements.’lxviii 
Divisions within the Administration also affected the question that arose in 
early 1970 of ‘how deeply the President’s personal prestige is to be engaged 
on a specific ABM deployment plan this year.’ Lynn informed Kissinger of his 
doubts about whether the DoD could be trusted to whole-heartedly support 
the Administration’s ABM policy: ‘My opinion is that very heavy 
commitment of the President’s prestige has more risks this year than last 
because I have no confidence that DOD’s defense and advocacy of the 
decision will be conducted with skill and wholehearted devotion.’lxix 
Kissinger then reported to the president his concerns about that year’s 
Congressional battle: ‘I believe it is likely that we will have another bloody 
fight on the Hill. Whereas last year we took the opposition by surprise, this 
year they will be well prepared.’lxx 
Kissinger outlined the dilemma to Nixon, pointing out that ‘with respect to 
the Minuteman defense mission, we may well be damned if we do and 
damned if we don’t. … If we continue to emphasize Minuteman defense, and 
if the technical arguments discussed above are valid, we will be denounced 
for proceeding with a virtually worthless system. … If we don’t add a further 
Minuteman site, and emphasize the area defense rationale, we will be 
criticized for inconsistency with DOD’s arguments last year.’lxxi 
Kissinger’s summary of Safeguard’s effectiveness was bleak: ‘We might face a 
Soviet capability to destroy most of the Minuteman force beginning about 
1974, when neither the new hard point defense systems nor the alternative 
basing arrangements would be available. However, - and this is perhaps the 
most disturbing point of all – I gather it is the view of many technical people, 
including those in the Army agency responsible for ballistic missile defense, 
that the Safeguard units we could have ready by then would not make any 
appreciable difference in the number of Minuteman which would survive 
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such an attack. For example, having Safeguard Phase 1 is projected in one 
Army analysis as saving only 20 Minuteman against an all-out counterforce 
attack by both SS-9s and upgraded SS-11s.’lxxii 
Technical Advice 
 
The widely-held nature of such doubts about Safeguard’s performance is one 
of the most startling things that emerges from the documents available in the 
Nixon archives. The Nixon Administration had not sought wider scientific 
advice on its decision to press ahead with the Safeguard programme (much to 
the annoyance of many opponents).lxxiii Nixon’s indifference to technical 
issues was evident when he dismissed the concerns of his Science Advisor, 
Lee DuBridge, who relayed PSAC’s doubts when he told Nixon on March 11, 
1969 that Safeguard ‘can’t really do the job’.lxxiv However, a 5 March memo 
from Kissinger to Nixon made it clear that they understood the ABM’s 
technical limitations: ‘The Administration can make no claim that the system 
will be effective against other than surprise attacks on bombers, accidental 
attacks, or early Chinese attacks, and very limited attacks on Minuteman.’lxxv 
These limited objectives were nevertheless considered sufficiently worthwhile 
when put alongside Nixon and Kissinger’s desire to match Soviet military 
developments and certainly not to disarm unilaterally (as they saw it). 
Nixon’s determination to press ahead with Safeguard meant that PSAC’s 
skeptical advice, that had been readily accepted by the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy Administrations, was no longer welcome. Instead, as noted earlier, 
many who had worked for previous Administrations, including some from 
PSAC, testified against Safeguard in the 1969 Congressional debates (and 
Nixon would eventually show his displeasure with PSAC by disbanding it in 
1973lxxvi). However, PSAC’s analysis of Safeguard’s weaknesses were not 
simply the result of its narrow scientific calculations or of (what some 
certainly saw as) its liberal analysis of the superpower arms race. Rather 
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PSAC’s views were widely shared, and indeed informed, by many other key 
actors including the Army. 
Despite this, paradoxically, it was possible for reviews of the programme – 
such as the FY1972 Safeguard Review - to report that ‘technical progress on 
Safeguard has been very good and there are no serious technical 
problems.’lxxvii Each individual component of the Safeguard system – the 
Spartan and Sprint missiles, their nuclear warheads, the two large radar 
systems, and the associated software and communications – apparently 
performed satisfactorily in tests.lxxviii However, few thought that these tests, 
and the design specifications that they were meant to confirm, adequately 
captured the requirements of a large-scale nuclear attack.  
In particular, the challenges for area defense of the population were quite 
different from those for point defense of hardened targets such as Minuteman 
silos. Area defense relied almost entirely on the use of Spartan interceptors 
because the short-range Sprint could only protect a localized area. Using 
Sprint missiles to defend the major urban populations of the USA (estimated 
to be about 200 at the timelxxix) would have been impractical because of the 
large numbers that would have been required. 
The longer range Spartan had a much larger ‘footprint’, but because 
interception would take place outside the atmosphere there was the potential 
problem of decoys and chaff to contend with. Moreover, if the incoming 
warheads were targeted at urban areas there was much less potential for 
’preferential defense’ (ignoring reentry vehicles on trajectories not directed at 
high value targets). This latter tactic, and the possibility of using Sprint 
interceptors, meant that point defense was considered more achievable in 
principle. If defending a Minuteman field, reentry vehicles not aimed at silos 
could be ignored. Moreover, light-weight countermeasures would have been 
stripped away by atmospheric drag and so defense using Sprint did not need 
to discriminate between decoys and reentry vehicles. 
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However, both the Army and Bell Laboratories, the prime contractors for 
Safeguard, had doubts about Safeguard’s effectiveness in defense of 
Minuteman. This was particularly problematic since that was the role of the 
first (and as it turned out, only) deployed Safeguard site. The Army’s doubts 
were reported to Kissinger in January 1970 when it was noted that: ‘What is 
both surprising and troubling is the view, apparently circulating in the Army 
Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, that the Safeguard system would not make a 
significant contribution to Minuteman defense even during the interim 
period, from, say 1974 to 1978, when the threat may be great but new systems, 
either defensive or offensive, won’t be available.’lxxx 
These concerns had been highlighted in a study by the PSAC Strategic 
Military Panel, summarized by its chairman Sidney Drell in a December 23, 
1969 letter to DuBridge. This was relayed to Kissinger in early January: 
Whatever may be the substantive validity of the technical 
arguments, this paper – prepared almost exclusively on the 
basis of ABMDA briefings – suggests that the Army, in pushing 
its alternative hard point defense concepts, is vigorously 
poormouthing the Minuteman defense potential of Safeguard. If 
– or rather when – that fact leaks, it could significantly 
strengthen the opposition’s arguments not only against 
expanding the system, but even against the Phase I decision.lxxxi 
The 1969 OSD review of Safeguard also did little to calm these concerns. NSC 
staffer Lynn worried that it ‘could be interpreted as conceding three major 
points to the Safeguard opposition: - DOD now agrees that the Soviets could 
overwhelm the Safeguard defenses and destroy the Minuteman force; (I 
cannot yet confirm DOD’s arithmetic, but I suspect that there are plausible 
assumptions under which a lot less than 2000 arriving Soviet RVs would 
destroy virtually all of the Minuteman force.) – DOD now agrees that 
Safeguard components are not the “optimum” way to defend Minuteman; - 
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DOD now agrees that the Safeguard Minuteman defense will be obsolete 
within three to four years after it is first deployed.’lxxxii The prospects for area 
defense appeared no better:  
The DOD paper also suggests that Chinese penetration aids 
could make area defense “very difficult” and that this 
possibility is a “serious technical argument against the system,” 
though DOD does not believe this will happen soon. DOD does 
not point out, however, that routine Soviet deployment of 
penetration aids on their ICBMs and SLBMs, which is a very real 
possibility because they are probably now testing them, would 
also make area defense “very difficult.” What then will become 
of our area defense?lxxxiii 
Similar views were also expressed to the President by Republican Senator 
John Sherman Cooper, who wrote: ‘My suggestions are based upon talks with 
scientists, not those who may be considered being anti your administration, 
but most notably those who support the development of an effective 
protection system for the US land based missiles, and also want to maintain a 
credible nuclear deterrent. Their general views are [that] Safeguard is not an 
effective weapon. An effective ABM system could be built, but redesign and 
reengineering including the deployment of many additional radars and 
interceptor missiles are needed.’’lxxxiv 
Then in April 1970 Bell Laboratories warned the Nixon Administration about 
their concerns over the performance of the technology. That month Kissinger 
sent a memorandum to the President reporting that: ‘The Bell people 
maintained that while the system will meet the technical specifications set for 
it, it is their belief that its contribution to military missions will be very 
slight.’lxxxv As the Bell comments make clear, the main concern was not about 
the performance of the technology relative to its specification, but rather that 
the system was poorly designed for its task. The problem was ‘not any 
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difficulty with the test program’, but ‘rather the technical argument being 
made in some quarters that the Safeguard components are not a very good 
way to defend Minuteman (or the National Command Authority, which is 
also, for these purposes, a “hard point”).’lxxxvi 
 
In particular, there was the problem of Safeguard’s reliance on one Missile 
Site Radar (MSR) at each site. In a memo to Kissinger, DuBridge reported that 
‘PSAC noted that the MSR radars which were taken over from the old 
Sentinel system, designed primarily for area defense, had important 
disadvantages when applied to the defense of Minuteman sites. … These 
large radar systems are extremely vulnerable and if certain of them were 
destroyed during an initial enemy attack, a large segment of our Minuteman 
force would be left defenseless.’lxxxvii  
Reliance on just one MSR at each site could be justified in Sentinel because the 
primary goal was defense against a very small Chinese threat, but the shift in 
emphasis in Safeguard to defense of Minuteman against a Soviet attack raised 
concerns about radar vulnerability. The Army had realised that this was 
problematic and had pushed for each Safeguard site to have two MSRs, but 
this had been rejected. Using two MSRs would have had two main benefits. 
First, geographically separated MSRs would have provided two lines of sight, 
and would have thus reduced the potential for a single high altitude nuclear 
detonation to black-out an area of the sky. Second, the risk of a whole 
Safeguard site being rendered useless if the MSR was destroyed would be 
reduced since there would be at least one back-up.  
It was clear that: ‘To deal with really large threats to Minuteman, we should 
have a system which is less dependent on a few big radars.’lxxxviii However, 
the Administration was already committed to, and building, a system that 
relied on the large MSR radar approach. Within the NSC it was thought that 
‘the DOD proposal for substantial program of R&D on new concepts for hard 
point defense is likely to be taken as reflecting lack of confidence in the 
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Safeguard components’ usefulness for hard point defense.’ Instead, the 
question was raised of whether ‘these technical doubts’ meant that they 
‘should de-emphasize the Minuteman defense role of Safeguard, either 
deferring any further deployments until the technical picture is clarified, or 
giving priority to sites for area defense.’lxxxix 
However, as deployment moved slowly, and Congressional approval of new 
sites even slower, it was clear that Minuteman defense was the only rationale 
that could be made for the time being. The Administration pushed ahead, and 
on January 30, 1970 Nixon announced the FY 71 plans for Safeguard.xc 
Safeguard expansion was to build on the original two sites with a further six. 
Of these, a site defending the Minuteman field at Whiteman AFB was to go 
ahead with construction, while the other five were scheduled for preliminary 
work.xci One of these– at Warren AFB in Wyoming – was also to protect a 
Minuteman field, while the other four would provide population defense. 
However, one of these four – at Washington, DC - also had a special role as it 
would be intended to defend the National Command Authority (NCA). This 
would also prove a particularly tricky proposition, both for domestic political 
reasons, and also because of its role in the SALT negotiations. 
 
Safeguard and SALT 
 
 
By this time the SALT negotiations were underway - the first round of talks 
began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969. Leading the US delegation was 
Gerard Smith, the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). Following the first round of talks he made a plea – which the 
Administration ignored - ‘that from the point of view of strategic arms 
control, it would be desirable to keep Safeguard Phase II in R&D status 
during FY-71.’xcii In practice, however, Phase 2 remained under wraps 
because the Senate would not endorse much beyond Phase 1. 
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A second round of talks began on 16 April, 1970 when the US made what 
Kissinger later referred to a ‘first-class blunder’ by offering an option for 
limiting ABM systems to one NCA-orientated site for each side.xciii This was a 
compromise position within the Administration and a demonstration of what 
Kissinger viewed as ‘the extent to which parochial bureaucratic 
considerations can overwhelm substance’.xciv The problem with this option 
was that it bore little relation to the system currently being deployed by the 
US. A Washington DC site geared towards NCA protection was in the 
Administration’s plans, but no construction had begun, nor would it as the 
Senate refused to endorse the plan. Indeed the Administration itself was 
divided on the value of an NCA-defense, with two main reservations leading 
to dissent. First, there was concern ‘that the debate may serve only to call 
attention to the vulnerability of our command and control long before a 
defense is operational’.xcv Second, there were worries about political 
opposition, both from DC residents who feared the local deployment of 
interceptor missiles, and ironically from non-DC residents critical of giving 
special protection to politicians –resulting in ‘protests, however irrational, 
against defending “politicians and generals but not ordinary people.”’xcvi 
These concerns fed a general unease – expressed, for example, by Senator 
Jackson – that consideration of a NCA defense would introduce ‘unnecessary 
complications into the debate.’xcvii  
The NCA option made sense in the context of SALT - as a mirror image of the 
Soviet Moscow ABM system it might simplify negotiations: ‘From the SALT 
point of view, protection of Washington is the easiest of all possible US ABM 
deployment to defend because it corresponds more obviously to the system 
the Soviets have constructed around Moscow.’xcviii  However, it had little 
support within the NSC:  
There are concerns over the value of an NCA defense and 
whether we ought to be building it at all.  
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– Against a large attack, the NCA defense would buy only a few 
minutes’ time.  
– An intentional attack could be undertaken by means other 
than by ICBMs, e.g. single aircraft, submarine-launched cruise 
missiles, clandestinely introduced weapons.  
– While the NCA defends against accidents, an accidental ICBM 
launch against Washington appears to have a low probability of 
occurring.xcix 
However, the Soviet Union had promptly accepted the US offer to limit ABMs 
to just one NCA-defense, and the US delegation struggled to regain the 
initiative, and to link any agreement on limits on defensive systems to one on 
limits on offensive weapons. On August 4, 1970 the US put forward a new 
proposal on offensive systems coupled with a complete ban on ABM systems 
(although the NCA-only proposal was not withdrawn).c Not surprisingly this 
led to difficulties with the talks, with the Soviet side arguing for a separate 
agreement on ABM systems along the lines that the US had proposed earlier. 
Although this approach had originally come from the US side, it had become 
increasingly untenable in the light of the unwillingness of the Senate to 
endorse a NCA-defense for Washington, DC. The Administration’s ABM 
policy was now very confused, with procurement out of kilter with the 
negotiating stance. As Kissinger recalled: ‘The Senate was being asked to 
proceed with construction of one additional ABM site and preliminary work 
on five others at the very moment our Vienna delegation was proposing to 
the Soviets either a total ABM ban or a system limited to Washington for 
which we had not even requested funds.’ci  
In January 1971 Kissinger summed up the situation by noting that: ‘We are 
building an area defense which we can’t have, justifying a missile defense 
which won’t work and negotiating an NCA defense we don’t want.’cii These 
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contradictions were also noted in the summary of a National Security Council 
(NSC) discussion in preparation for the 1971 annual Safeguard review: 
This year’s review of our Safeguard systems presents us with 
unique problems. We find ourselves in the following unique 
position:  
- We are building an area defense for which we may not be able 
to get Congressional approval. Moreover, we are prepared to 
give up this system in SALT.  
- We are justifying before the Congress a defense of Minuteman 
which we find is not particularly effective in defending 
Minuteman  
- We are negotiating in SALT an NCA [national command 
authority] defense for which there is dubious strategic 
justification.ciii 
In March 1971 Nixon sought to resolve this dilemma by proposing that an 
agreement could be based on the Soviets keeping their Moscow system while 
the US kept the Safeguard sites that Congress had so far approved. A 
presidential decision on March 11 affirmed the continuing development of a 
four-site Safeguard system with no NCA site, and directed that the SALT 
negotiating position be aligned with this.civ 
This also fitted better with US strategic doctrine. Secretary of Defense Laird 
had made the point in January 1971 that, in his view, there was ‘a clear 
contradiction between the strategic sufficiency criteria of NSDM-16, and the 
SALT guidance of NSDM-74.’ According to Laird, one of the requirements of 
NSDM-16 was ‘that we give the Soviets no incentive to strike first in a crisis, 
and therefore require that we assure the survivability of our deterrent forces. 
The currently authorized 4-site SAFEGUARD system would perform this 
function.’cv  
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However, Laird also noted that: ‘The sufficiency criteria call for area defense 
of our population against Chinese or other small missile attack. This criterion 
can only be satisfied by deployment of the full 12-site SAFEGUARD (area 
defense).’ This contradicted the SALT guidance in which ‘NSDM-74 specifies 
our willingness to forego area defense of the country and any defense of our 
deterrent forces against Soviet missiles, if the Soviets will agree to limit 
ABM’s to Moscow and Washington and to accept numerical limits on 
offensive systems.’cvi  
There was therefore a contradiction in the policies ‘because the provisions of 
NSDM-74 allow improvements in the Soviet missile threat which could by the 
mid-1970’s make Minuteman vulnerable, and because these provisions 
preclude our area defense without limiting the Chinese or other threats 
identified in NSDM-16.’ Laird was clear where his preferences lay in sorting 
out this contradiction. He considered that: ‘Abandoning area defense may be, 
on balance, a proper price to pay to achieve a strategically acceptable 
agreement with the Soviets.’ On the other hand, he was convinced ‘that we 
cannot tolerate a vulnerable Minuteman force. Therefore, I recommend that 
NSDM-74 be modified to make clear that the agreement described is an initial 
agreement which must be followed before the mid-70’s by a further 
agreement which adequately fixes the vulnerability problem.’cvii 
However, although Laird supported the idea that the US should be allowed to 
keep four Safeguard sites in return for the Soviet retention of its one Moscow 
defense, this was met with incredulity by the US SALT delegation. It now 
appeared that the US had three concurrent ABM proposals, with the earlier 
offers of a complete ban or NCA-defense only still on the table. Gerard Smith 
later noted that ‘the fix for our differing SALT and congressional ABM 
postures was to table yet a third ABM alternative consistent with what the 
Administration was trying to get the Congress to support, a four-site 
Safeguard deployment.’cviii 
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In May 1971 the Soviets agreed to drop their insistence on NCA-only ABM 
systems, and also accepted the US insistence on linkage of offensive and 
defensive systems by agreeing to discuss the two simultaneously.cix The 
problem now, however, was that Nixon’s proposal would allow each side to 
keep the ABM system it currently had in development. For the Soviet Union, 
this was the Moscow system, while for the USA it was the four Safeguard 
sites at Minuteman ICBM fields that had so far been approved by Congress. 
This was a suggestion that the Soviets considered ‘manifestly inequitable’.cx 
Further US proposals reduced the ratio to three ICBM field defenses to one 
NCA-defense, but were equally unacceptable to the Soviet side. Finally, the 
Soviet side made a proposal, that although initially rejected by the US 
Administration, would form the basis of the final agreement. Under this 
proposal each side could have one NCA defense and one ICBM defense. On 
this basis the ABM Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972. In 1974 a further 
protocol was agreed that limited each side to just one site, either NCA or 
ICBM defense, thus formalising the de facto situation. The Soviet kept its 
Moscow system and the USA kept the Safeguard site at Grand Forks, albeit 
not for long. 
The successful ABM negotiations stopped any further Safeguard deployment 
and the end for the one deployed site came in the autumn of 1975. Secretary 
of Defense Schlesinger had already told Congress in February 1974 that 
Safeguard would only be operated at full capacity for a year, before being 
‘maintained on a less than full time basis’.cxi DoD testimony to the House 
Committee on Appropriations confirmed that Safeguard could be 
overwhelmed by a Soviet missile attack and on October 2, 1975 only a day 
after Safeguard had been declared operational, the House voted to deactivate 
the system.cxii Further votes in the Senate in November confirmed the House 
vote, with the proviso that the Safeguard perimeter and acquisition radar 
could remain in operation.cxiii Even committed ABM supporters found the 
expense hard to justify, given the doubts about effectiveness, along with the 
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realization that the ABM Treaty meant that Grand Forks would stand alone in 
the missile defense role. It could no longer be viewed as a building block for 
the future; rather it would become a monument to the past.cxiv 
Conclusion 
 
Contrary to the fears of ABM opponents, the deployment of Safeguard did 
not result in unstoppable technological momentum, but rather the opposite. It 
marked the end rather than the beginning of ABM development. This case 
study thus shows that the ‘vested interests’ of what has been called the 
Military-Industrial-Complex are far from all-powerful. Safeguard’s 
continuation depended on far more than just the support of the armed 
services and industry, and even their support was far from uniformly 
enthusiastic.  
The war in Vietnam and the increased emphasis on conventional defense of 
Europe led to ‘flagging interest in BMD’ in the Army in the late 1960s.cxv Even 
the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Agency was lukewarm about Safeguard 
because it did not consider that its technical design (originally intended for 
defense against a very light Chinese threat) was appropriate for defense 
against a large Soviet threat. Instead, ABMDA sought approval for a new 
approach, known as ‘hard-site’, to defend Minuteman missiles. The prime 
contractor of Safeguard – Bell Laboratories – became increasingly skeptical 
too. Not only did Bell Labs assess the operational effectiveness of Safeguard 
to be low, but they also made it clear that they had no future interest in ABM 
contracts.cxvi  
 
Despite the huge amount of effort and money that went into it, Safeguard did 
not become locked-in. Unlike Walker’s case-study of UK nuclear 
reprocessing, the commitment of almost all the key actors was transitory, with 
no legal or contractual obligations proving a barrier to cancellation. The 
future of Safeguard thus depended on the coalition of interests that Nixon 
had assembled, and this proved remarkably fragile. In the end it was the 
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SALT agreement and ABM Treaty that would endure as the legacy of 
Safeguard rather than the technology itself. 
 
Maybe this was Nixon’s intention all along – that he wanted Safeguard as a 
‘bargaining chip’ to pressure the Soviets to participate constructively in the 
SALT process.cxvii This is what Nixon claims in his memoirs, and it also 
supported by the recollections of Wiesner who at a meeting just after the 
Safeguard announcement was told by Nixon that: ‘I need the system as a 
bargaining chip with the Russians’.cxviii 
 
However, it does not seem to be the case that Nixon intended to negotiate 
Safeguard away entirely. Rather it appears (I have found no definitive 
evidence either way in the archives) that Nixon did not pursue Safeguard 
solely as a bargaining chip, but was also initially focussed on the strategic 
benefits that ABM deployment could provide, particular as regards 
population defence against China. Raymond Garthoff (who was a member of 
the Department of State delegation in SALT) claims that Nixon ‘personally 
favoured ABM deployment and expected (mistakenly) that the Soviets too 
would want a nationwide thin deployment against China’.cxix 
 
Nor was a complete ABM ban considered a desirable goal by the Nixon 
Administration in terms of the military balance with the Soviet Union. 
Analysis of possible force structures carried out in preparation for SALT 
showed that a complete ABM ban did not appear to be in the USA’s best 
interests, at least if judged narrowly according to what would happen in a 
nuclear war. Thus, Kissinger reported to Nixon on May 23, 1969 that ‘an ABM 
ban would appear to be much more in the Soviet interest than ours. In fact, it 
is probably not in our interest.’cxx  
 
Moreover, had Nixon only viewed Safeguard as a bargaining chip then he 
would surely not have pushed population defense when this was likely to be 
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opposed not only by some within his Administration (who preferred the 
emphasis to be on Minuteman defense), but also by the ‘arms controllers’ in 
Congress who believed that such a deployment would only stimulate the 
Soviet Union to build more offensive weapons. Garthoff argues that Nixon’s 
initial enthusiasm for Safeguard was tempered by the difficulty the 
Administration had in gaining Congressional approval: 
 
The ABM debate of 1969 had a number of important 
consequences. First, it made President Nixon and his 
administration more fervent partisans of ABM deployment … 
The debate also made clear, however, that the longer term 
prospect for sustaining political support for ABM deployment 
was not good, and thus made the ABM system something that 
Nixon was more ready to limit (and trade) in SALT.cxxi 
 
ABM supporters who had argued for deployment throughout the 1960s thus 
achieved a pyrrhic victory when they won Congressional approval of 
Safeguard in 1969. Rather than this being the start of a shift towards defensive 
systems, Safeguard would mark the end of an era. Although some R&D 
would continue on the use of nuclear-armed interceptors for defence of US 
ICBMs (it was one option considered as a solution to the perceived 
vulnerability of the new MX missile), this type of BMD technology was falling 
out of favour. Other developments in BMD technology – involving lasers, 
space-based systems, and homing hit-to-kill interceptors – appeared to offer 
the potential for a non-nuclear defence, and these would form the basis for 
the next major phase in BMD development, instigated in 1983 by President 
Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech. However, these developments took place in a 
political context in which the ABM Treaty encapsulated the belief that the 
mutual vulnerability of the superpowers to each other’s nuclear arsenal, while 
perhaps undesirable, was nevertheless unavoidable.  
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It was only with the break up of the Soviet Union that the political mood  
shifted decisively back in favour of ballistic missile defense of the USA. 
Although technical feasibility continues to be disputed, the feared threat that 
might be posed by so-called ‘rogue nations’ such as Iran and North Korea is 
expected to be much smaller and less challenging than that previously posed 
by the Soviet Union. BMD technology has thus come to be seen as more 
effective not primarily through technical progress – though there has been 
significant progress – but rather because of a change in the nature of threat. 
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